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WILD DUNES AND SERBONIAN BOGS: THE IMPACT
OF THE LucAs DECISION ON SHORELINE
PROTECTION PROGRAMS
RICHARD C. AUSNESS*
INTRODUCTION.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,I the United Supreme Court
was forced once again to delve into the law of regulatory takings.2 This
experience is seldom a pleasant one. Echoing the poet John Milton, an
exasperated state court judge once described takings law as a "Serbo-
nian Bog."3 Unfortunately, the takings doctrine is only slightly more
comprehensible after the Lucas decision than it was before. Neverthe-
less, progress in this area, however modest, deserves praise, and the
Court is to be commended for clarifying one aspect of takings jurispru-
dence. As a result of Lucas a "categorical rule" has been announced that
provides for compensation when a state regulation deprives a landowner
of all economically valuable property use.
4
The claimant in Lucas owned two unimproved beachfront lots in the
Wild Dunes Resort on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island located near
Charleston, South Carolina. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law
that authorized the South Carolina Coastal Council to establish con-
struction setback lines.5 The purpose of these setback lines was to miti-
gate the effects of erosion in coastal areas. 6 The Coastal Council
established a setback line landward of Lucas' back property line, effec-
tively preventing him from building on either of his lots. 7 Lucas
brought suit, arguing that the regulation constituted a taking of his
* Richard C. Ausness (B.A. University of Florida 1966, J.D. University of Florida
1968, L.L.M. Yale 1973) is a professor at the University of Kentucky College of Law.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
2. The takings or just compensation clause of the fifth amendment provides that pri-
vate property may not be taken for public use without payment ofjust compensation. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. Governmental actions that do not physically appropriate private prop-
erty, but instead unduly restrict its use, are known as regulatory takings. See Nathaniel S.
Lawrence, Regulatory Takings: Beyond the Balancing Test, 20 URB. LAw. 389, 390 (1988).
3. City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. 1978) ("arguing that regula-
tory taking law is a sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog") (quoting Brazos River Auth. v.
City of Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 105 (Tex. 1962)). The reference is to a description of
Hell from Milton's Paradise Lost:
A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog
Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old,
Where armies whole have sunk: the parching air
Burns frore, and cold performs the effects of fire.
JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, Bk. II, I1. 592-95.
4. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
5. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-39-270, 280 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
6. Natasha Zalkin, Shifting Sands and Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme Court s Changing Tak-
ings Doctrine and South Carolina's Coastal Zone Statute, 79 CAL. L. REV. 205, 220-21 (1991).
7. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90.
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property without just compensation. The state trial court, in ruling for
the claimant, concluded that the regulation left the property with virtu-
ally no market value. 8 The South Carolina Supreme Court overturned
the trial court decision by concluding that the state may pass regulations
to prevent harm to the public without having to pay compensation. 9
Having granted certiorari, ' 0 the Court held that compensation must
be paid if a police power regulation deprives a landowner of all econom-
ically valuable use of his or her property."I This decision produced a
bitter division within the Court. This Article argues that the categorical
takings rule set forth by the majority in Lucas is analytically sound and
fully consistent with the true meaning of the Takings Clause. Further-
more, the Article concludes that Lucas reflects a long overdue reorienta-
tion of the Court's takings jurisprudence in favor of private property
rights. At the same time, however, the categorical takings rule of Lucas
is fairly narrow and should not threaten most state shoreline protection
programs.
The Article is divided into four parts. Part I reviews the property
regime of coastal areas as well as some representative shoreline manage-
ment schemes. Part II explores the "Serbonian Bog"-the law of regu-
latory takings. Part III examines South Carolina's Beachfront
Management Act and analyzes the Lucas decision in some detail. Finally,
Part IV evaluates the significance of Lucas and discusses its potential im-
pact on various aspects of shoreline management and environmental
protection.
I. THE LEGAL REGIME OF COASTAL AREAS.
A. Private and Public Rights Along the Shoreline.
In most states, the mean high water line marks the boundary be-
tween public and private ownership in the shoreline. 12 Although land
above the mean high water line is subject to private ownership, public
rights are paramount in the area below (or seaward of) this line. 13
8. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 907 (S.C. 1991) (Har-
well, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 900-02.
10. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
11. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893-94.
12. Frank E. Maloney & Richard C. Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean
High Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 185, 200-201 (1974). The
mean high water line represents the intersection of a vertical tidal datum with the shore-
line. Id. at 195. Tidal datums are elevations based on the average rise and fall of the tide.
See Peter K. Nunez, Comment, Fluctuating Shoreline and Tidal Boundaries: An Unresolved Prob-
lem, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 447, 451-52 (1969). These datums are generally calculated on
the basis of a nineteen year period of observations. This period is used to determine tidal
datums because all of the cycles related to the phases, declinations, and distance of the
moon occur within this time frame. Maloney & Ausness, supra, at 198.
13. Richard C. Ausness, Land Use Controls in Coastal Areas, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 391, 396
(1973). In some states, the mean low water line constitutes the usual boundary between
public and private shoreline property. State ex rel. Buckson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 228
A.2d 587, 601 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, Inc.,
173 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Mass. 1961); In re Hadlock, 48 A.2d 628, 630 (Me. 1946); Whealton
[Vol. 70:3
WILD DUNES
Both Roman law 14 and English common law,' 5 acknowledged that
members of the public could use the foreshore and adjacent tidal waters
for purposes of navigation, fishing and commerce. 16 This right was
known as thejus publicum. 17 In the United States, thejus publicum, which
includes recreation as well as more traditional public uses, '8 is protected
by a concept known as the public trust doctrine. According to this doc-
trine, the state holds title to the foreshore and the land beneath naviga-
ble waters in trust for the benefit of the public. 19 Even when the state
transfers such property into private ownership, public rights are not en-
tirely lost as long as the property remains physically capable of being
used for trust purposes.
20
Most of the shoreline above the mean high water line is now pri-
vately owned and those who own such property typically possess certain
littoral rights. The most important of these littoral rights is access to the
water.2 1 Littoral owners also possess the right to navigate, fish, swim
and bathe in the sea and its surrounding tidal waters.22 Finally, these
owners get the benefit of any increase in littoral property caused by the
deposit of soil on the land by currents or other natural forces. 23 Con-
versely, they risk losing any land that erodes away when the shoreline
recedes.
24
& Wisherd v. Doughty, 82 S.E. 94, 96 (Va. 1914); Commonwealth ex rel. Hensel v.
Y.M.C.A., 32 A. 121, 127 (Pa. 1895); Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524, 526 (1845).
14. Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA
GRANT L.J. 13, 21-36 (1976); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sover-
eignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 633-43
(1986); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79
YALE L.J. 762, 763-64 (1970).
15. Richard C. Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of in-
stream Flows, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 409-411 (1986); GlennJ. MacGrady, The Navigability
Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doc-
trines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511, 549-68 (1975).
16. Stephen A. DeLeo, Note, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi and the Public Trust Doc-
trine: Strengthening Sovereign Interest in Tidal Property, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 571, 585 (1989);
Melissa A. Heath, Note, A Tidelands Trust for Georgia, 17 GA. L. REv. 851, 866 (1983).
17. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
18. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 472 (1988); Matthews
v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 362 (N.J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821
(1984); State v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (Haw. 1977); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374,
380 (Cal. 1971).
19. ThomasJ. Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C. L. REV.
1, 16-17 (1972); Bertram C. Frey, Note, The Public Trust in Public Waterways, 7 URB. L. ANN.
219, 226 (1974).
20. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380-81 (Cal. 1971) (owner who acquired tide-
lands from state not automatically entitled to dredge and fill property).
21. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Madeira
Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Hollan v. State, 308
S.W.2d 122, 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
22. See, e.g., Butler v. Attorney Gen., 80 N.E. 688, 689 (Mass. 1907).
23. This is known as the doctrine of accretion. A related concept, the doctrine of
reliction, increases the property of the littoral owner when the water permanently uncov-
ers a portion of the seabed, leaving it dry. Carol E. Dinkins, Texas Seashore Boundary Law:
The Effect of Natural and Artificial Modifications, 10 Hous. L. REV. 43, 46 (1972).
24. See id. at 50. However, the doctrines of accretion, reliction and erosion only apply
when the shoreline changes are "gradual and imperceptible." See County of St. Clair v.
Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 68 (1874). Thus, the original boundary remains as it was when the
19931
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In recent years, certain activist courts attempted to redefine prop-
erty interests to enhance the rights of the public at the expense of pri-
vate landowners.2 5 One aspect of this trend is the expansion of such
concepts as prescription, implied dedication, customary rights and the
public trust doctrine for the purpose of increasing public access to pri-
vately-owned portions of shoreline.2 6
A number of courts use prescription to extend public access to dry-
sand beaches. A prescriptive right requires the claimant to exercise ac-
tual, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse use over the property under a
claim of right for fixed period of time.2 7 In Moody v. White,2 8 for exam-
ple, the court found that the public acquired a prescriptive right since
members of the public appropriated the dry-sand beach as their own by
using it for hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, sunning, and other rec-
reational purposes.
29
Other courts rely on the doctrine of implied dedication to provide
public access to privately-owned beaches.3 0 A dedication is express
when it is made by oral declaration or written instrument.3 ' A dedica-
tion is implied when the intention to dedicate is inferred from the acts
shoreline is shifted suddenly by severe storms or hurricanes. Maloney & Ausness, supra
note 12, at 226. Furthermore, in many states, legal boundaries do not change if the physi-
cal shoreline is altered by artificial structures. Mary C. Whitney, Comment, The Federal
Rule of Accretion and California Coastal Protection, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1462-63 (1975).
25. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 492 So. 2d 339, 342 (Fla.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987) (public trust doctrine invoked to invalidate sover-
eignty lands mistakenly conveyed into private ownership during nineteenth century as
swamp and overflowed lands); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 721
(Cal.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (existing appropriative water rights in nonnavigable
tributaries can be restricted under public trust doctrine to prevent harm to navigable
freshwater lake); State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 664-65 (Ark.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843
(1980) (owners of freshwater streams subject to public rights under newly promulgated
"recreational test" of navigability); County of Haw. v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57 (Haw. 1973)
(extending public ownership of beaches from high water line to farthest reach of the
waves); McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 517 P.2d 26 (Haw.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1973) (changing state riparian rights doctrine); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d
761, 769 (Wis. 1972) (lands adjacent to navigable waters are subject to special regulation
under the public trust doctrine).
26. In theory, public rights extend only to the wet-sand beach below the mean high
water line. See Frank E. Maloney, et al., Public Beach Access: A Guaranteed Place to Spread Your
Towel, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 853, 855 (1977). However, if members of the public are com-
pletely excluded from dry-sand areas, they may be prevented from using the wet-sand
areas as well because of the existence of natural or manmade barriers. See Steve A. Mc-
Keon, Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564, 566 (1970).
27. Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property: Judicial Theories and the
Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REV. 627, 631 (1989). Because members of the public often share a
beach with the littoral owner, the adversity requirement, if strictly enforced, may defeat a
claim of prescriptive right. See Maloney, supra note 26, at 859. See also City of Daytona
Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 76-77 (Fla. 1974) (public's use was permissive
because littoral owner allowed members of the public onto beach to induce them to use its
commercial pier facilities).
28. 593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
29. Id. at 374.
30. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 59 (Cal. 1970); Seaway Co. v. Attorney
General, 375 S.W.2d 923, 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
31. Note, Public Access to Beaches: Common Law Doctrines and Constitutional Challenges, 48
N.Y.U. L. REV. 369, 370 (1973).
440 [Vol. 70:3
WILD DUNES
and conduct of the landowner.32 Thus, continuous, uninterrupted use
of a parcel of land by the members of the public may give rise to an
inference that the owner intended to dedicate the land to public use.33
Seaway Company v. Attorney General3 4 illustrates the application of this
principle to shoreline areas. In that case, the court found the general
public used the beach for more than a hundred years without permission
or interference from littoral owners.3 5 This was sufficient for the court
to conclude that Seaway impliedly dedicated its property to the public
for recreational purposes.
3 6
Some courts uphold public claims to the dry sand beach based on
the ancient doctrine3 7 of customary rights. s8 To qualify as a customary
use, a public use must be ancient, uninterrupted, peaceful, reasonable,
certain of description, obligatory with respect to affected landowners,
and not repugnant to or inconsistent with other customs or law.3 9 Until
recently, state courts overwhelmingly refused to recognize the doctrine
of customary rights as a part of American law.40 However, in State ex rel.
32. Margit Livingston, Public Access to Virginia's Tidelands: A Framework for Analysis of Im-
plied Dedications and Public Prescriptive Rights, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 669, 684 (1983).
33. See Alice G. Carmichael, Comment, Sunbathers Versus Property Owners: Public Access to
North Carolina Beaches, 64 N.C. L. REV. 159, 168-9 (1985). Once an implied offer to dedi-
cate is made and accepted, the owner cannot revoke the offer. McKeon, supra note 26, at
573. Furthermore, the public cannot lose its rights through nonuse or adverse possession.
Luise Welby, Note, Public Access to Private Beaches: A Tidal Necessity, 6 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'y 69, 78 (1986).
34. 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
35. Id. at 933-34.
36. Id. at 940. California has also applied the doctrine of implied dedication to
beaches. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970). In Gion, the court declared
that an intent to dedicate could be implied from adverse use as well as by acquiescence on
the part of the littoral owner. Id. at 55. According to the Gion court, evidence that the
beach has been used as if it were a "public recreation area" for the five-year prescriptive
period was sufficient to support a finding of adverse use. Id. at 56. Furthermore, the court
disagreed that public use of the beach was presumptively permissive. Instead the court
required the landowner to prove that the use was pursuant to a license or that the land-
owner had made a bona fide effort to prevent the public from using the property. Id. at 57.
37. The doctrine of customary rights originated in England, where by immemorial
custom, residents of towns and manors exercised certain use rights over private land. See
Lew E. Delo, Note, The English Doctrine of Custom in Oregon Property Law: State ex rel. Thorn-
ton v. Hay, 4 ENVTL. L. 383, 389 (1974); David R. Miller, Comment, Easements: Judicial and
Legislative Protection of the Public's Rights in Florida's Beaches, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 586, 591
(1973).
38. United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769 (D.V.I. 1974),
aff'd, 529 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975); Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271
So. 2d 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd in part, 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974); State ex rel.
Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969); In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968). How-
ever, a number of states have refused to apply the doctrine of customary rights to beaches.
E.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 179 (Me. 1989); Leabo v. Leninski, 438 A.2d
1153, 1156-57 (Conn. 1981); Smith v. Bruce, 244 S.E.2d 559, 569 (Ga. 1978); Department
and Council of Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 638 (Md. 1975);
Gilies v. Orienta Beach Club, 289 N.Y.S. 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 288 N.Y.S. 136
(N.Y. App. Div. 1936).
39. See Hay, 462 P.2d at 677; Alfred Clayton, Jr., Note, Oregon's "New" Doctrine of Cus-
tom: McDonald v. Halvorson, 26 WILLAME-rrE L. REV. 787, 792 (1990); Susan P. Stephens,
Access to the Shore: A Coast to Coast Problem, 3J. LAND USE & ENv-rL. L. 95, 112-13 (1987).
40. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Prop-
erty, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 717 (1986).
1993]
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Thornton v. Hay,4 1 the Oregon Supreme Court approved the doctrine of
customary rights and upheld a ban on fences and other barriers across
the dry-sand portion of the beach. 42
Finally, a few courts invoke the public trust doctrine to protect pub-
lic access to the dry sand beach. Most of these decisions involve nonres-
ident access to municipally-owned beaches.43 New Jersey, however,
extends this principle of nondiscrimination to private beaches as well.
44
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, both the forces of nature
and activist courts threaten the use and enjoyment of private property in
coastal areas. Landowners learned to live with the dramatic conse-
quences of floods and hurricanes, as well as the more subtle losses of
beach erosion. But now, in addition to the physical alteration of beach-
front areas by natural forces, shorefront landowners are increasingly
threatened by judicial attacks on property rights. Additionally, as shown
in the next section, property owners are also threatened in some states
by legislation that greatly restricts the right to build in shoreline areas.
B. Regulation of Shoreline Development.
Due to aesthetic and recreational values, the nation's coastal areas
are prime targets for residential and commercial development. 4 5 How-
41. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
42. The court observed the public had peacefully used the dry-sand beaches and fore-
shore since the beginning of the state's political history and that this use had never been
interrupted by littoral landowners. Moreover, the public had always made use of the land
in a manner appropriate to the land and to the usages of the community. The scope of this
public right was visibly delimited by the physical boundaries of the dry-sand beach and by
the character of the land. The evidence also showed that the dry-sand beach in question
had been used, as of right, uniformly with similarly situated lands elsewhere. Therefore,
allowance of public use of the dry-sand beach was not left to the option of individual
landowners. Finally, the court concluded that public use of the dry-sand beaches of the
state violated no law and was not inconsistent with any other customs. Accordingly, the
court held that the public had acquired a customary right to use the dry-sand beach for
recreational purposes. Id. at 676-678. But see McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714 (Or.
1989) (holding that customary rights do not necessarily extend to all beaches in the state).
43. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978); Borough of Nep-
tune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972); Gewirtz v. City of Long
Beach, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
44. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 821 (1984). In Matthews, a group of individuals sought to compel the Bay Head Im-
provement Association, a private nonprofit organization, to open its beachfront property
to the general public. The trial court held in favor of the Association and this decision was
affirmed by an intermediate appellate court. Id. at 358. The Association maintained its
beachfront property for the benefit of its members during the summer months. Member-
ship was generally restricted to Bay Head. Id. at 359.
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that the public trust doctrine pro-
tected recreational uses as well as fishing and navigation. Id. at 363. The court declared
that the public had to have some rights in the dry-sand beach in order to exercise its rights
to the foreshore. Id. at 364. According to the court, this rationale applied to private, as
well as municipally-owned beaches. Id. at 365. Furthermore, not only must the public be
allowed to travel across privately-owned beaches in order to reach the foreshore, but it
must be allowed to use these beaches for recreational purposes as well. Id. In this case,
the court ruled that the general public should be allowed to join the Association, regard-
less of whether they were residents of Bay Head or not. Id. at 368-69.
45. See David Owens, Land Acquisition and Coastal Resource Management: A Pragmatic Per-
spective, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 625, 625 n.3 (1983).
[Vol. 70:3
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ever, uncontrolled development can cause a great deal of harm to the
coastal environment. Erosion now occurs in almost every coastal area.
4 6
Although some of the erosion is natural, 4 7 much of it is caused by im-
proper placement of artificial structures. 48 Furthermore, development
near estuarine areas often threatens delicate marine habitats. 49 Finally,
development on barrier islands often destroys sand dunes and thereby
increases the risk of storm damage.
50
Encouraged by grants from the federal government, 5 1 virtually
every coastal state enacted legislation to protect the shoreline environ-
ment.5 2 A number of states established construction setback lines in
46. Id. at 626. Over the past 100 years, the Atlantic coast has receded an average of
two to three feet per year, while the Gulf shoreline has receded an average of four to five
feet per year. Erosion also occurs on a smaller scale on the West Coast. See Dennis J.
Hwang, Shoreline Setback Regulations and the Takings Analysis, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991).
47. The movement of sand and sediment can profoundly affect the shoreline. Under
natural conditions, sand and gravel eroding from rocks and soils inland are carried down-
stream by rivers and streams. These particles ultimately reach the shoreline where they
are deposited as beach sand. Michael A. Corfield, Comment, Sand Rights: Using California's
Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Against Coastal Erosion, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 727, 731 (1987).
Littoral currents remove this sand from where it has been originally deposited and trans-
port it to another beach or out to sea. Frank E. Maloney & Anthony J. O'Donnell, Jr.,
Drawing the Line at the Oceanfront: The Role of Coastal Construction Setback Lines in Regulating
Development of the Coastal Zone, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 383, 390 (1978).
48. Artificial structures can interfere with the movement of sand and sediment and
cause erosion. For example, structures, such as groins and jetties, that extend out perpen-
dicularly into the water, contribute to beach erosion by interrupting the flow of sand along
the shoreline. Zalkin, supra note 6, at 214. In addition, seawalls and other vertical struc-
tures change the shoreline's natural slope and absorb the full force of the waves. This
causes a turbulent, scouring action at the base of the structure that accelerates the removal
of sand from the surrounding area. Maloney & O'Donnell, supra note 47, at 390. Finally,
improved inlets increase erosion by causing sand to pile up on the updrift side of the shore
and blocking it from the downdrift side. FRANK E. MALONEY ET AL., WATER LAW AND AD-
MINISTRATION-THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE § 93.1 (1968).
49. Ausness, supra note 13, at 392; David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property:
A Call forJudicial Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 339-40 (1988); Kenneth W. Parsons, Note, Environmental Law-Preser-
vation of the Estuarine Zone, 49 N.C. L. REV. 964, 970 (1971).
50. Zalkin, supra note 6, at 213-14.
51. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1988), is the
primary source of federal funding for state shoreline regulation activities. This statute
authorizes grants to states that develop and implement a coastal management program
that satisfies certain statutory requirements. Id. § 1454(a) (development grants); id.
§ 1455(a) (administrative grants). For a further discussion of the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act, see generally Sarah Chasis, The Coastal Zone Management Act: A Protective Mandate, 25
NAT. RES. J. 21 (1985); Daniel R. Mandelker & Thea A. Sherry, The National Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, 7 URB. L. ANN. 119 (1974); RonaldJ. Rychlak, Coastal Zone Manage-
ment and the Search for Integration, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 984-90 (1991).
52. See ALA. CODE §§ 9-7-10 to 9-7-20 (1987); ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.40.10 to 46.40.210
(1992) (The Alaska Coastal Management Program); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000 to
30900 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992) (The California Coastal Act of 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 22a-90 to 22a-1 13j (West 1958 & Supp. 1992) (The Coastal Management Act);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7001-7013 (1991) (The Coastal Zone Act); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 161.052-161.200 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992) (The Beach and Shore Preservation Act);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-210 to 12-5-312 (Michie 1988) (The Shore Protection Act); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 205A-1 to 205A-49 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (Hawaii Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:213.1-49:214.41 (West Supp. 1992) (Louisiana
Coastal Wetlands Conservation, Restoration, and Management Act); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 38, §§ 480A to 490 (1964 & Supp. 1991); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to 9-603
(1990 & Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21A, § 4A (West Supp. 1988); Miss.
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coastal areas in order to control development and protect against
coastal erosion.5 3 Most of these states require new structures to be
placed a certain distance from a fixed line, such as a vegetation line,
dune line, or mean high water line.54 Other states, however, employ a
floating setback line.5 5 Unlike a fixed setback line that is uniform along
the entire coastline, a floating setback line will vary according to the his-
torical rate of erosion in a particular area. 56 The purpose of this regula-
tory technique is to ensure that buildings are located far enough inland
to have a reasonable lifespan before being threatened by erosion.5 7 Un-
fortunately, as Lucas illustrates, floating setback lines often impose ex-
cessive burdens on the owners of shorefront property.
II. THE LAW OF REGULATORY TAKINGS.
Perhaps because of its complexity, the takings issue has intrigued
generations of legal scholars, inspiring them to write numerous articles
on the subject.5 8 This Article does not try to improve upon these ef-
forts, but instead merely provides a brief overview, with special empha-
sis on those aspects of takings law involved in the Lucas case.
A. The Police Power.
States, through the exercise of their police power, may regulate the
CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-1 to 49-27-69 (1990) (The Coastal Wetlands Protection Act); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to 13:19-21 (West 1991) (The Coastal Area Facility Review Act);
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 34-0101 to 34-0113 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1992)
(Coastal Erosion Hazard Areas); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ I13A-100 to 113A-134.3 (1990 &
Supp. 1991) (North Carolina Environmental Policy Act of 1971); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 196.405 to 196.515 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-23-1 to 46-23-21 (1991); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op 1986 & Supp. 1991) (The Beachfront Man-
agement Act of 1988); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001 to 33.176 (West 1992) (The
Coastal Public Lands Management Act of 1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 28.1-101.4 (Supp.
1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.51.650 to 43.51.765 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992).
53. Hwang, supra note 46, at 5.
54. ALA. CODE § 9-7-10 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7004 (1991); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 205A-43(a) (Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 438A(l) (1989 & Supp.
1991).
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.053 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (100-year storm surge set-
back line); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-5 (West 1991); N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAW § 34-
0103(3)(a) (McKinney 1984) (setback line calculated at 40 times annual erosion rate); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § lI3A-118 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(B)(4) (Law. Co-op Supp.
1991) (setback line calculated at 40 times annual erosion rate).
56. The floating setback line is determined by calculating the annual rate of erosion,
based on historical data. This figure is then multiplied by a factor of 30 to 100 as deter-
mined by the statute. Hwang, supra note 46, at 9.
57. Id. at 3-4.
58. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977);
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS-PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985); Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752
(1988); Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165
(1974); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of 'just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings
Clause.- In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77
CAL. L. REV. 1299 (1989); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36 (1964).
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use of private property in order to promote the health, safety, morals or
general welfare of their citizens. 59 These governmental regulations
must, however, meet the requirements of substantive due process.
60
The "rational basis" test is the prevailing approach for reviewing due
process challenges. 6 ' This test considers whether the regulation ad-
vances any valid governmental interest 6 2 and whether the means chosen
provides a rational method for accomplishing this purpose.63 Tradi-
tionally, the Court accords a great deal of deference to legislative judg-
ments regarding regulatory means and ends.64 However, even if a
regulation satisfies the requirements of the due process clause, it may
still violate the takings clause6 5 if it takes property without just compen-
sation.6 6 If the regulation is deemed to be a taking, the government
must either abandon the regulation or compensate the injured party.
6 7
B. Traditional Takings Tests.
1. The Physical Invasion Test.
The physical invasion test requires the government to pay compen-
sation when it permanently occupies private property. 6 8 This rule uses
objective criteria and, therefore, is relatively predictable and consis-
tent.6 9 However, the physical invasion test only has limited applicability
and, therefore, it rarely serves as a deciding test in regulatory taking
59. Robert I. McMurry, Comment,Just Compensation orJust Invalidation: The Availability
of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1982).
60. The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides that no person shall be
deprived of property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
61. Denis Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional
Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1972).
62. See Chicago B. & 0. Ry. v. Ill. ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592
(1906); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
63. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313,
320 (1890); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888).
64. E. George Rudolph, Let's Hear It for Due Process-An Up to Date Primer on Regulatory
Takings, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 355, 374 (1988).
65. The takings or just compensation clause of the fifth amendment provides that pri-
vate property may not be taken for public use without payment ofjust compensation. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The takings clause is binding on the states through the application of
fourteenth amendment. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles
County, 482 U.S. 304, 310 n.4 (1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990); Webb's Famous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U.S. 104, 110 (1911); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
66. In theory, the due process clause and the takings clause are concerned with en-
tirely different issues. However, some commentators suggest that these provisions cannot
be entirely separated. John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for
the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 485-86 (1983);James L. Oakes, "property Rights" in
Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583, 592 (1981).
67. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 321.
68. See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 750 (1947) (dam raised water level,
causing flooding of plaintiff's land); United States v. Lynah,. 188 U.S. 445, 469 (1903)
(overflow from navigation project turned plaintiff's rice plantation into a bog); Pumpelly v.
Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1872) (state authorized dam on river
caused upstream lake to overflow its banks and flood plaintiff's land).
69. Neal S. Manne, Note, Reexamining the Supreme Court's View of the Taking Clause, 58
TEX. L. REV. 1447, 1465 (1980).
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cases. 70 Furthermore, the test is arguably unfair because it compensates
trivial losses, 7 1 while denying compensation for substantial loses when
no physical invasion occurs, even when the landowner's loss is more
severe.
7 2
2. The "Noxious Use" Test.
The "noxious use" test allows states to regulate, without paying
compensation, activities that create a risk of significant harm to the pub-
lic regardless of the economic effect on the regulated parties. 73 In ef-
fect, this rule vindicates the right of the government to protect the
public against harmful spillover effects from private activity. 74 Thejusti-
fication usually given for the denial of compensation is that no one can
obtain a vested right to injure or endanger the public; therefore, the
abatement of a noxious use is not a taking of property. 75 The noxious
rule is generally applied to nuisances or "nuisance like" activities. 76 It
works tolerably well in these circumstances, but provides little help in
resolving conflicts among socially desirable, but incompatible,
activities.
7 7
3. The Harm/Benefit Test.
The harm/benefit rule was derived from the noxious use rule.
78
Under this approach, no taking occurs if the government regulates to
prevent a landowner from causing harm to others. However, a taking
occurs if the purpose of the regulation is to force the landowner to con-
70. Binder, supra note 61, at 3.
71. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
For a brief description of the Loretto decision, see infra nn. 101-103 and accompanying text.
72. See John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for theJust-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regu-
lation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 252 (1982).
73. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (upholding law that required
destruction of cedar trees infected with cedar rust parasites); Samuels v. McCurdy, 267
U.S. 188,195-96 (1925) (upholding law prohibiting possession in plaintiff's home of alco-
holic beverages purchased before passage of state prohibition law); Pierce Oil Corp. v.
City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498, 499 (1919) (upholding ban on oil and gasoline storage tanks
near residential dwellings); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (upholding
prohibition of brickyard in residential area); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171,
177 (1915) (upholding ban on livery stables in residential area); Murphy v. California, 225
U.S. 623, 629 (1912) (upholding ordinance against pool halls); L'Hote v. New Orleans,
177 U.S. 587, 598 (1900) (upholding ban on houses of prostitution in certain areas);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (upholding closure of plaintiff's brewery).
74. See Ross B. Lipsker & Rebecca L. Heldt, Regulatory Takings: A Contract Approach, 16
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195, 211 (1988).
75. Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 330 (1905); New Orleans Gas Light Co. v.
Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453, 462 (1905).
76. See Andrea L. Peterson, The Taking Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part II-
Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without MoralJustification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 55, 86
(1990) (suggesting that the noxious use rule allows confiscatory regulation without com-
pensation only if the public would regard the regulated activity as "wrongful").
77. Sax, supra note 58, at 48-50. In addition, the noxious use rule is arguably unfair in
cases where the landowner could not reasonably foresee that a particular use might subse-
quently become harmful to the public. Berger, supra note 58, at 174-75.
78. Hunter, supra note 49, at 323-24. The harm/benefit test was first devised by Pro-
fessor Ernst Freund. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS § 511 at 546 (1904).
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fer a benefit on the public. 79 The Supreme Court does not treat the
harm/benefit approach as a distinct test. 80 However, state courts fre-
quently rely on this test to uphold land-use controls in environmentally
sensitive areas.81
In theory, there is a significant difference between preventing a
harm and securing a benefit.8 2 However, in practice, it is often difficult
to maintain this distinction on a principled basis. 83 In addition, critics of
the rule charge that the concept of harm can be expanded to cover just
about anything.
84
4. The Diminution-in-Value Test.
Under the diminution-in-value test, a regulation that reduces the
value of property beyond a certain point is treated as a taking. 8 5 Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon8 6 is commonly thought to be the original
source of this doctrine.8 7 In that case, a coal company challenged the
validity of a statute prohibiting the mining of anthracite coal if the min-
ing caused subsidence of overlying residential property. Writing for the
Court, Justice Holmes declared that while some diminution in value is
permissible, "[w]hen it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act."
8
79. Allison Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
650, 665-66 (1958); Lipsker & Heldt, supra note 74, at 211. According to Professor
Michelman, the rationale of the harm/benefit rule "is that compensation is required when
the public helps itself to good at private expense, but not when the public simply requires
one of its members to stop making a nuisance of himself." Michelman, supra note 58, at
1196.
80. But see Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 138-39 (1978).
81. See, e.g., Graham v. Estuary Prop. Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1381 (Fla. 1981) (uphold-
ing a ban on destruction of mangrove forest); Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Bd.,
485 A.2d 287, 292 (N.H. 1984) (upholding denial of permission to fill wetlands); Carter v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (S.C. 1984) (upholding a prohibition
on filling in tidal wetlands); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1081 (Wash. 1987) (up-
holding a prohibition on filling privately-owned tideland areas); Just v. Marinette County,
201 N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (Wis. 1972) (upholding prohibition on filling along the shore of a
navigable lake).
82. Dunham, supra note 79, at 664-65.
83. Catherine R. Connors, Back to the Future: The "Nuisance Exception" to the just Compen-
sation Clause, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 139, 184 (1990). In the majority opinion of Lucas, justice
Scalia also recognizes that the difference between benefit and harm may be only a matter
of perception. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897-98 (1992).
84. Sondra E. Berchin, Comment, Regulation of Land Use: From Magna Carta to a just
Formulation, 23 UCLA L. REv. 904, 911 (1976).
85. Donald W. Large, This Land Is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property,
1973 Wis. L. REv. 1039, 1056 (1973).
86. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
87. Peterson, supra note 58, at 1325. It appears that Justice Holmes mentioned dimi-
nution-in-value on several occasions prior to the decision in Pennsylvania Coal. See, e.g.,
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (if an exercise of police
power renders property "wholly useless, the rights of property would prevail over the
other public interest, and the police power would fail"); Interstate Consol. St. Ry. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907) ("the question narrows itself to the magnitude of
the burden imposed").
88. 260 U.S. at 413. Applying this principle, Holmes concluded that the statute made
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In applying the diminution-in-value test to determine whether com-
pensation must be paid, the Court looks to the extent of economic loss
suffered by the property owner.8 9 This involves determination of a nu-
merator and a denominator - that is, the value to the property before
and the value after the regulation is applied. 90 The Court must then
calculate the percentage of the decline in value and decide whether the
decline is sufficient to constitute a taking.9 '
There are a number of difficulties with the diminution-in-value test.
In the first place, it is not clear whether excessive diminution in value
alone constitutes a taking or whether it is merely one factor for the
Court to consider in deciding takings controversies. 9 2 Moreover, the
diminution-in-value test provides no standard by which to determine
how much of a diminution is a taking. 93 Finally, the rule does not iden-
tify which property interests must be taken into account when calculat-
ing a regulation's economic effect.
94
C. Modern Takings Tests.
Each of the traditional takings tests focuses on a single factor, such
as the physical consequences of the government's action, the motivation
behind the challenged regulation, or its economic impact on the claim-
ant's property. In the last decade or so, the Court has tended to employ
takings tests that require more than one factor to be considered. The
two most popular approaches are the Penn Central balancing test and the
Agins two-factor test.
1. The Penn Central Balancing Test.
This test made its debut in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.9 5
The Penn Central case arose out of the refusal of the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Commission to allow Penn Central to construct
a multi-story office building over Grand Central Station Terminal (the
Terminal). 96 Penn Central claimed that the New York Landmarks Pres-
ervation Law deprived it of all gainful use of the airspace above the Ter-
minal. The Court considered the following factors to determine
it unprofitable to remove coal from the land in question, and thus destroyed the value of
the company's mineral estate. This, in his view, constituted a taking. Id. at 414.
89. Susan J. Krueger, Comment, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis:
Toward Redefining Takings Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 877, 879 (1989).
90. Donald W. Large, The Supreme Court and the Takings Clause. The Search for a Better
Rule, 18 ENVrTL. L. 3, 19 (1987); Michelman, supra note 58, at 1229-34.
91. Id. at 19-20.
92. Peterson, supra note 58, at 1327.
93. Craig A. Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme Court
Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 339 (1988); Rose, supra note 58, at 566.
94. Michelman, supra note 58, at 1192-93; David A. Myers, Some Observations on the
Analysis of Regulatory Takings in the Rehnquist Court, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 527, 541 (1989).
95. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
96. Under this law, any change in the exterior structure of a building designated as a
historic landmark required a permit from the Landmarks Preservation Commission. In
1967, the Commission classified Grand Central Station Terminal, which was owned by
Penn Central, as a historic landmark. Id. at 115-17.
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whether a taking occurred: (1) the character of the governmental action
involved; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the economic impact of
the regulation upon the property owner.9 7 Applying these factors to the
facts of the case, the Court upheld the New York law.9 8
a. Character of Governmental Action.
This factor involves both the "type of taking" alleged and the "na-
ture of the state action." The "type of taking" inquiry looks to whether
the government action is a physical invasion or whether it is an accepted
form of economic regulation. 99 The "nature of state action" analysis
focuses on the justification for the government's action, and in particu-
lar, on whether it is attempting to prevent harm to the public. 0 0
i. The "Type of Taking."
The Court focused almost entirely on the "type of taking" in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 101 The Court struck down a New
York statute that required landlords to permit cable television compa-
nies to install cable facilities on their property upon payment of a nomi-
nal fee.' 0 2 The Court characterized this relatively trivial intrusion as a
property restriction of unusually serious character.
10 3
The "type of taking" also influenced the Court's decision in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 10 4 a case which involved public access to a nonnavi-
gable pond. The landowner, with the permission of the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps of Engineers), connected one end
of the pond with the ocean and constructed a marina at the other end.
Later, the Corps of Engineers sought to compel the landowner to allow
members of the public to use the pond and marina. 10 5 Although the
Court acknowledged that the pond had become navigable for purposes
of federal regulation, it refused to rule that the federal navigation servi-
tude requires public access to private property without payment of
compensation. '
0 6
97. Id. at 124.
98. Id. at 138.
99. Thomas A. Hippler, Comment, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory
Taking Doctrine: The Principles of "Noxious Use, " "Average Reciprocity of Advantage, "and "Bundle
of Rights"from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 653, 713
(1987).
100. Peterson, supra note 58, at 1318-19.
101. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
102. Id. at 441.
103. Id. at 426.
104. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
105. Id. at 168.
106. Id. at 179-80. The navigation servitude doctrine provides that the federal govern-
ment does not have to compensate landowners who are injured when it exercises its power
over navigable waters under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Grand River
Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 233 (1960) (federal government not required to pay owner of
condemned property for water power rights); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350
U.S. 222, 228 (1956) (same); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510
(1945) (federal government not required to pay owner of hydroelectric dam for reduction
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ii. The "Nature of State Action."
In Keystone Bituminous CoalAss'n v. DeBenedictis 107 the Court looked at
"the nature of state action" to determine if a taking occurred.' 0 8 Key-
stone involved a state statute that prohibited mining which might cause
subsidence to certain buildings. Regulations adopted pursuant to this
statute required fifty percent of the coal beneath these structures to be
kept in place to provide surface support.' 0 9 The plaintiffs sought to en-
join state officials from enforcing the statute or its regulations."l 0 On
appeal, the Court declared that the government had a substantial inter-
est in preventing harm from nuisance-like activities and, therefore, the
Court did not require compensation."' The Court upheld the statute
in part by suggesting that mining operations that harmed the property
of third parties were similar to noxious uses.1 12 This case effectively
incorporated the noxious use rule into the Penn Central balancing test. '
13
b. Investment-Backed Expectations.
Deprivation of "investment-backed expectations" may also consti-
tute a regulatory taking.' "4 The rationale behind the protection of in-
vestment-backed expectations is similar to the reliance rationale that
underlies the doctrines of estoppel and vested rights in zoning law.
51 5
However, to claim interference with investment-backed expectations,
the property owner must be able to point to specific facts and circum-
stances that make such expectations reasonable.
16
The burden of proving the existence of investment-backed expecta-
tions is often a difficult one for property owners to meet. For example,
the Court rejected the landowner's investment-backed expectations
in water flow caused by construction of flood control project); United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 65-66 (1913) (federal government not required to
pay owner of condemned dam for water power rights).
107. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The Court seems to have also used the Agins two-factor test
in Keystone. See Peterson, supra note 58, at 1329.
108. 480 U.S. at 488-90.
109. Id. at 476-77.
110. The trial court refused to grant the requested injunction. Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 581 F. Supp. 511, 520 (W.D. Pa. 1984). This decision was
affirmed by the court of appeals. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d
707, 719-20 (3d Cir. 1985).
111. 480U.S. at492.
112. Id.
113. SeeJames S. Burling, Property Rights, Endangered Species, Wetlands, and Other Critters-
Is It Against Nature to Pay for a Taking?, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 309, 343 (1992) (nuisance
exception could be viewed as an element of the "character" of government action).
114. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Professor
Frank Michelman appears to have coined this expression. See Michelman, supra note 58, at
1233 (a taking occurs when a claimant is deprived of "distinctly perceived, sharply crystal-
lized, investment-backed" expectations).
115. Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 WASH. U.
J. URB. & CoNTEMp. L. 3, 42 (1987). For a discussion of these concepts see John Martinez,
Reconstructing the Takings Doctrine by Redefining Property and Sovereignty, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
157, 181-82 (1988).
116. Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause. A Modern Plot for an Old Constitutional Tale,
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 41 (1989).
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claim in the Penn Central. case, concluding that its expectations largely
focused around the Terminal's traditional use as a railroad station.
Since the law only restricted a use of the airspace, the Court felt that it
did not frustrate Penn Central's expectations with respect to use of the
Terminal. 17 Conversely, the landowner in Kaiser Aetna persuaded the
Court that by allowing the landowner to improve the pond, the Corps 3f
Engineers created certain expectancies, including the expectancy that
the landowner could continue to exclude the public from the pond and
the marina." 18
c. Economic Impact.
Obviously, the size of the burden imposed on a property owner by a
regulation is relevant to the taking issue.' 19 At the same time, even a
severe economic impact does not necessarily constitute a taking.' 2 0
Moreover, the Court developed several techniques that undercut claims
of adverse economic impact in taking issue cases. One concept is the
doctrine of average reciprocity of advantage. The other is that the en-
tire "bundle of rights" in a piece of property should be considered when
measuring the economic impact in a takings analysis.
i. Average Reciprocity of Advantage.
"Average reciprocity of advantage" originally meant that the state
was not required to pay just compensation when a party giving up prop-
erty received a new benefit not shared by the general public. 12 1 This
rule implicitly assumed the regulation standing alone might be a taking,
but the new benefit was payment in kind, rather than in cash, which sat-
isfied the compensation requirement.' 2 2 This appears to be what hap-
pened in Penn Central, where the plaintiff claimed the Landmark
Preservation Law only benefitted the general public. The Court ac-
knowledged that the burden fell disproportionately on Penn Central,
but nevertheless concluded that the fact that some benefit accrued to
Penn Central was sufficient to compensate the landowner.' 23 The cur-
rent approach is to regard any general benefits that arise from the regu-
117. 438 U.S. at 136. See also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,
227 (1986) (employers withdrawing funds from multi-employer pension plans required to
provide adequate funding for vested pension benefits); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1006-07 (1984) (health and safety data required to be submitted to EPA not
protected against disclosure).
118. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
119. Michelman, supra note 58, at 1191; Wilkins, supra note 116, at 30.
120. Krueger, supra note 89, at 892.
121. Connors, supra note 83, at 173. The reciprocal advantage principle was tradition-
ally invoked to justify special assessments.
122. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 21
(1988).
123. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134-35 (1978). Justice
Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the landowners did not receive any benefit
from the law. Id. at 139-40. See also Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private
Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481, 485 (1983) (contending that there was no plausible reci-
procity of advantage to the landowner in Penn Central).
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lation as mitigating the economic harm it imposes on a particular
property owner. 1
2 4
ii. Effect of the Regulation on the Entire Property
Interest.
The Court generally insists that economic impact be assessed in
terms of the entire property interest of the regulated party.' 25 Never-
theless, property owners occasionally utilize a tactic known as "concep-
tual severance" to defeat this policy. This involves "severing" from the
whole bundle of rights just those aspects of property use that are im-
paired by the regulation and then treating them as a separate property
interest. 1 2
6
In Penn Central, for example, the landowner claimed that the
Landmark Preservation Law deprived it of all gainful use of the airspace
above the Terminal. Rejecting this attempt at conceptual separation,
the Court declared that it must consider the economic impact of the law
on Penn Central's entire "bundle of rights" in the Terminal and not
restrict its inquiry to one particular aspect of these rights.
12 7
The plaintiffs in Keystone also employed a conceptual separation
strategy. They contended that the coal that would have to be left in the
ground was a separate property interest being taken by the state.
128
However, the Court rejected this argument by concluding that this coal
did not constitute a separate property interest distinct from the plain-
tiffs' coal reserves as a whole.
129
2. The Agins Two Factor Test.
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 130 the plaintiffs challenged the validity of
124. Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New
Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297, 351 (1990) (reciprocal advantages
contribute to an economic mix effectively diluting the level of a regulation's impact).
125. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ("where an owner possesses a
full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a tak-
ing, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety").
126. Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence
of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1988).
127. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. Furthermore, the Court observed, the
Landmarks Preservation Law did not completely destroy the value of the airspace above
the Terminal because it allowed Penn Central to transfer its "development rights" in the
airspace to other nearby property that it owned. In the Court's view, this mitigated any
loss that Penn Central might suffer if were denied all use of the airspace above the Termi-
nal. Id. at 137.
128. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496-97.
129. Id. at 498. Although, the plaintiffs would be required to leave 27 million tons of
coal in place, this only amounted to about two percent of the their total coal reserves of
1.46 billion tons. Furthermore, the plaintiffs conceded that no individual mine would be
rendered unprofitable by the regulation. Id. at 496. The plaintiffs also argued that the
statute destroyed a separate legal interest known as the "support estate." Id. at 496-97.
However, the Court denied that the support estate was really a distinct property interest.
According to the Court, the support estate had value only when it was used in connection
with either the mineral estate or the surface estate. Therefore, the Court refused to con-
clude that the statute completely destroyed the support estate. Id. at 500-01.
130. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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two local ordinances that limited the number of residential dwellings
that could be constructed on their five-acre tract of land. The plaintiffs
maintained that the city's density restrictions would make it economi-
cally impossible for them to develop their property.'13 On appeal, the
Court applied a two-part test to facial challenges to the land use control
regulations. Under this approach, a taking would occur if either: (1) the
regulation failed to substantially advance a legitimate state interest; or
(2) if it deprived the landowner of all economically viable use of his or
her property. 
13 2
a. Substantially Advance Legitimate Governmental Goals.
The requirement that a regulation "substantially advance legitimate
governmental goals" is traditionally associated with substantive due pro-
cess. In Agins, however, the Court incorporated this principle into its
takings analysis.' 3 3 The Court concluded that Tiburon's ordinance sub-
stantially advanced legitimate governmental goals by protecting the
public against the adverse effects of uncontrolled urbanization. 134 In
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 13 5 however, the Court ruled that to
"substantially advance" a legitimate state interest, a "reasonable nexus"
must be established between the regulation and the public need it seeks
to address.136 Furthermore, satisfying this test requires close scrutiny of
both the ends served by governmental action, as well as the means used
to achieve them.'
3 7
Some commentators suggest that "substantially advance" aspect of
Agins is not only a "means-ends" test, but that it is also concerned with
the nature of the state's interest.13s Thus, the central consideration of
this test is whether the state is attempting to prevent a substantial harm
to the public. For example, in Keystone, the Court first asked if the stat-
ute served a legitimate public purpose, 13 9 and then considered whether
the government was seeking to prevent a noxious use of the plaintiffs'
131. The California Supreme Court upheld the validity of the ordinance. Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979).
132. 447 U.S. at 260.
133. See Norman Williams,Jr. et al., The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193,
213-14 (1984) (criticizing the Court for injecting substantive due process concepts into
takings analysis).
134. 447 U.S. at 261.
135. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
136. The plaintiffs in Nollan sought permission from the California Coastal Commis-
sion to build a house on a parcel of beachfront property. However, the Commission re-
fused to issue the necessary permit unless the plaintiffs agreed to grant an public easement
along the beach. The Commission claimed that an easement was necessary to protect the
public's ability to see the beach, to overcome the "psychological barrier" created by a
developed shorefront, and to prevent congestion on public beaches. The Court failed to
see how the permit condition would achieve any of these objectives. Id. at 836.
137. Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Means, Motives, and Takings: The Nexus Test of Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 242-43 (1988); Wilkins, supra note
116, at 8.
138. See, e.g., Burling, supra note 113, at 343; Peterson, supra note 58, at 1328.
139. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485-88.
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property. 140 It is not clear, however, whether compensation would be
required under this approach if the Court concluded the state was seek-
ing to prevent a nuisance.
b. Deprivation of All Economically Viable Use.
Under the Agins formula, a regulation that substantially advances a
legitimate state interest can still result in a taking if it deprives the claim-
ant of all economically viable use of his property. 14  It is not clear
whether this language is to be taken literally or whether it is merely a
restatement of the diminution-in-value principle. The Court never an-
swered this question in Agins because it could not determine whether the
plaintiffs had suffered any loss as a result of the ordinances. ' 42 In subse-
quent cases where the issue has arisen, the Court never found that a
regulation deprived a claimant of all economically viable use of his or
her property. 14
3
D. A Critique of Current Takings Jurisprudence.
As many legal commentators observe, the Supreme Court's current
takings jurisprudence leaves much to be desired. 14 4 First, the Court
uses inconsistent approaches in takings cases. The Penn Central test bal-
ances various factors without (except perhaps in the case of a physical
invasion) according preeminence to any one factor. 14 5 The Agins test,
on the other hand, is an "all or nothing" approach where a taking exists
if either element of the test is satisfied. 14 6 It has been suggested that the
Agins approach is applicable to facial challenges, while the Penn Central
140. Id. at 488-90.
141. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. The expression "no economically viable use" originated in
a footnote in the Penn Central case. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36.
142. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985)
(denial of permit to dredge and fill in wetlands area does not deny landowner all economi-
cally beneficial use of land).
144. See, e.g., Arvo Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1971) ("With some exceptions, the decisional
law [on the takings issue] is largely characterized by confusing and incompatible results,
often explained in conclusionary terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric.");
Epstein, supra note 122, at 4 ("the cases continue to mount up, and the pressures to distin-
guish and to reconcile them increase, until this array of ad hoc decisions becomes wholly
incomprehensible to legal and lay observer alike"); Humbach, supra note 72, at 244 ("the
law of police-power takings is a widely acknowledged hodgepodge, its doctrines a farrago
of fumblings which have suffered too long from a surfeit of deficient theories."); Peterson,
supra note 58, at 1303-04 ("the Court's takings doctrine is in far worse shape than has
generally been recognized-indeed .... it is difficult to imagine a body of case law in
greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray"); Rose, supra note 58, at 562 ("commentators
propose test after test to define 'takings,' while courts continue to reach ad hoc determina-
tions rather than principled resolutions"); William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and
Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1059 n.l I (1980) ("in truth, the collected deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, and all other courts [on the takings issue], leave the subject as
disheveled as a ragpicker's coat").
145. Peterson, supra note 58, at 1317.
146. Id. at 1329 n.152.
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test is used where "as applied" challenges are involved. 14 7 However,
the Court does not apply this distinction with any great degree of consis-
tency. Consequently, it is difficult to predict what test the Court will
apply in any given situation.
148
The Penn Central and Agins tests have also been criticized on indeter-
minacy grounds. Thus, it is claimed that the three factors in Penn Central
provide little structure to the Court's taking analysis. 149 First, the Court
defines each factor in a variety of ways without acknowledging shifts in
definition. 150 Second, the weight assigned to each factor varies from
case to case. 15 ' The Agins test is subject to similar criticism. Both the
"substantially advance" requirement' 5 2 and the "no economically viable
use" concept have been criticized for lack of clarity.153
To its credit, the Court appears to be gradually reducing the areas
of ambiguity in its takings issue jurisprudence. Thus, for example,
Loretto established a clear position with respect to permanent physical
invasions of real property154 and Nollan apparently tightened up the
"means-ends" test.' 5 5 In Lucas, the Court turned its attention to an-
other area of ambiguity, the "no economically viable use" concept of the
Agins test. What has emerged is a bright-line rule against government
regulation that totally deprives landowners of any productive use of
their property.
III. THE LucAs DECISION.
A. The South Carolina Beachfront Management Act.
South Carolina's original shoreline regulation statute, enacted in
1977, required landowners to obtain permits from the Coastal Council
before building homes or other structures in "critical areas."' 15 6 This
included beaches and primary sand dunes. 157 However, the 1977 Act
gave the Coastal Council no control over residential development land-
ward of existing beaches.' 5 8 In 1987, a Blue Ribbon Committee estab-
147. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96
(1981).
148. Peterson, supra note 76, at 57.
149. Thomas Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 372, 375-76 (1986) (Penn Central balancing approach criticized as "stochastic" be-
cause of indeterminacy).
150. Petersen, supra note 58, at 1317.
151. Id.
152. Note, Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 102 HARV. L. REV. 448, 455-58 (1988).
153. Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 841 F.2d 872, 877 (9th
Cir. 1987) ("the precise meaning of'economically viable use' of land is elusive and has not
been clarified by the Supreme Court").
154. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
155. See Krueger, supra note 89, at 905 ("The [Nottan] Court's description of the degree
of fit required between the ends and means of land-use regulations seems to signal a much
stronger examination of legislative purpose.").
156. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-130(A) (1987).
157. Id. § 48-39-10(J).
158. Zalkin, supra note 6, at 79.
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lished by the Coastal Council to study erosion control, recommended a
setback program that would move development sufficiently inland so
that residential structures would not be threatened by the natural ero-
sion cycle. 159 This suggestion led to the enactment of the 1988 Beach-
front Management Act (the Act).' 60
The Act provided for the establishment of "baselines" and con-
struction setback lines in coastal regions.161 The Act also distinguished
between standard erosion zones and inlet erosion zones. A standard
erosion zone was defined as a segment of shoreline that was subject to
the same set of coastal processes, had a fairly constant range of profiles
and sediment characteristics, and was not influenced directly by tidal in-
lets or associated inlet shoals.16 2 The Act defined an inlet erosion zone
as a segment of shoreline along or adjacent to a tidal inlet that was di-
rectly influenced by the inlet and the inlet's associated shoals.
16 s
Ordinarily, the baseline in the standard erosion zone would be lo-
cated along the crest of the primary oceanfront sand dunes in that
area. 164 However, if the shoreline was altered, either naturally or be-
cause of artificial structures, the baseline was to be placed where the
crest of the primary oceanfront sand dunes would have been if the
shoreline had not been altered.16 5 Where inlets had not been stabilized
by jetties, groins, or other structures, the baseline was to be located at
the most landward point of any erosion in the last forty years unless the
best available scientific and historical data indicated that the shoreline
was unlikely to return to its former location.
16 6
Once a baseline was established in a coastal area, the Act directed
the Coastal Council to establish a setback line landward of the baseline.
This setback line would be either forty times the annual erosion rate or
twenty feet, which ever was greater. 16 7 The Act generally prohibited the
construction of habitable structures seaward of the setback line.168 Nor-
mal repairs were allowed, 169 but a structure that had been completely
destroyed could only be replaced if certain conditions were met. 170 Fur-
159. NewmanJ. Smith, Analysis of the Regulation of Beachfront Development in South Carolina,
42 S.C.L. REv. 717, 720 (1991).
160. 1988 S.C. Acts 634, codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10, 48-39-130, and 48-
39-270 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. Supp 1991).
161. The Act required the Coastal Council to establish "interim" baseline and setback
lines by the Act's effective date. Id. § 48-39-280(C). The 1990 amendments required the
Council to establish final baselines and setback lines prior to July 3, 1991. Id.
162. Id. § 48-39-270(A)(6).
163. Id. § 48-39-270(A)(7). The property in Lucas was located in an inlet erosion zone.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889 n.1.
164. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(1).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(2). Baselines within inlet erosion zones were to be calculated
in the same manner as baselines in standard erosion zones. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(3).
167. Id. § 48-39-280(B).
168. Id. § 48-39-290.
169. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(1)(b)(i).
170. The new structure must not be larger, longer along the coastline, or closer to the
sea than the original structure. Furthermore, the new structure must be moved as far
landward as possible. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(1)(b)(iv).
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thermore, no damaged structure could be reconstructed seaward of the
baseline. 17 1 Finally, new erosion control structures were banned out-
right by the Act 17 2 and replacement of damaged structures was severely
restricted. 173
Some of the restrictions in the Act were later relaxed by the Legisla-
ture in 1990 to alleviate some of the hardships caused by Hurricane
Hugo. 174 For example, limited construction was allowed between the
baseline and the setback line. 175 In addition, the 1990 amendments au-
thorized the Coastal Council to permit construction seaward of the base-
line in certain situations.17 6 Finally, the amendments repealed a
provision that required landowners to replace, on an annual basis, all
sand in front of their property lost through erosion if they replaced hab-
itable structures or erosion control devices. 
177
B. The State Court Opinion.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 178 was one of several chal-
lenges to the validity of South Carolina's 1988 Beachfront Management
Act. 179 In 1986, the plaintiff in Lucas purchased two unimproved beach-
171. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(i)(b)(iv)(d).
172. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(2)(a).
173. The Act provides that an existing erosion control structure may not be replaced if
more than 80% of the "above grade" portion is destroyed. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(2)(b)(i).
That percentage drops to 67% in 1995 and 50% in the year 2005. Id. §§ 48-39-
290(B)(2)(b)(ii), 48-39-290(B)(2)(b)(iii).
174. Zalkin, supra note 6, at 221.
175. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(l)(a). Houses of less than 5000 square feet were allowed
within this area if no portion was constructed on a primary oceanfront sand dune and if the
structure was moved as far landward as possible.
176. Id. § 48-39-290(D)(1).
177. Id. § 48-39-350(A)(6).
178. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
179. See Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991);
Chavous v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 745 F. Supp. 1168 (D.S.C. 1990), rev'd sub
non. Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991). Esposito
and Chavous involved property in Hilton Head, South Carolina. The parties in Esposito
owned improved property located partially seaward of a baseline established by the
Coastal Council pursuant to the 1988 Act. The act prohibited repair or additions to struc-
tures located in this "dead zone." 939 F.2d at 167. The landowners brought a facial chal-
lenge to the Act, claiming that it constituted a taking of their property. The trial court,
however, ruled in favor of the Coastal Council. On appeal, the Circuit Court applied the
Agins test. First, it held that the state had an important interest in protecting its beaches
and that the Act was substantially related to the achievement of this goal. Id. at 169. Then
the court found that the Act did not deprive the landowners of all viable use of their prop-
erty because it permitted them to use it in the same manner as they did before the statute's
enactment. Id. at 170. Therefore, the court upheld the validity of the 1988 Act.
In Chavous, two landowners were denied permission to construct a house on a vacant
parcel of beachfront property. The landowners sued for money damages and injunctive
relief. The trial court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited a federal court from
awarding damages against the state. However, the court did find that the 1988 Act
amounted to a taking of the landowners' property and enjoined the Coastal Council from
enforcing the setback restriction against them. 745 F. Supp. at 1172. The case was consol-
idated with Esposito on appeal and the circuit court ruled that the 1990 amendments obvi-
ated the need for an injunction. See Esposito, 939 F.2d at 171. The court expressed no
opinion on whether the 1988 Act constituted a temporary taking of the landowners' prop-
erty between 1988 and 1990.
Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 403 S.E.2d 620 (S.C. 1991), decided by the
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front lots on the Isle of Palms near Charleston, South Carolina for
$975,000.180 The owners of all of the adjacent tracts constructed sin-
gle-family homes on their property and Lucas intended to do the same.
At the time Lucas purchased the property, neither lot was subject to
regulation under the existing Coastal Management Act' 8 1 and, there-
fore, the lots were not subject to regulation by the Coastal Council.
However, the Act mandated the baseline be fixed some distance land-
ward of the Lucas property 18 2 because the shoreline along this property
had fluctuated significantly over the past forty years.' 83 The construc-
tion setback line was located even further inland. Consequently, Lucas
was prohibited by the Act from building a structure on either lot except
for a small deck or walkway. 1
84
Lucas brought suit against the Coastal Council, alleging that the
building restriction constituted a taking of his property without just
compensation. The trial court found in his favor and awarded Lucas
more than $1.2 million.' 8 5 This decision, however, was reversed on ap-
peal by a divided South Carolina Supreme Court. 18 6
Lucas did not question either the objectives of the Act or the means
chosen by the legislature to achieve these objectives. Instead, he
claimed that the statute's provisions, as applied to him, deprived him of
"all economically viable use" of his property.'8 7 The majority opinion
acknowledged that economic impact was a relevant factor under the Key-
stone's multifactor analysis. 18 However, the opinion preferred to rely on
a line of United States Supreme Court cases that upheld regulations
without requiring just compensation when the state acted in order to
South Carolina Supreme Court shortly before its ruling in Lucas, involved a challenge to
the 1977 Coastal Management Act. In that case, several landowners brought suit to com-
pel the Coastal Council to allow them to construct a bulkhead across their beachfront
property. The lower court held that denial of the necessary permit amounted to a taking
of the plaintiffs' property. Id. at 621. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court con-
cluded that enforcement of the restriction would have little impact of the property. The
court also declared that the state did not have to compensate a landowner when the re-
striction was intended to prevent a serious harm to the public. Accordingly, the court
upheld Coastal Council's decision. Id. at 622.
180. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
181. Id. at 2889. At the time of purchase, the plaintiff's lots were located approxi-
mately 300 feet from the beach and dune line. Id. The 1977 Act only regulated "critical
areas." Critical areas did not extend beyond existing beaches and primary sand dunes. See
Smith, supra note 159, at 717-18.
182. The area in question was located in an inlet erosion zone that had not been stabi-
lized by jetties, terminal groins or other structures. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889 n.1. Conse-
quently, as required by the 1988 Act, the baseline was fixed at the most landward point of
the shoreline over the past 40 years.
183. Over the past 40 years, the shoreline had been subjected to both accretion and
erosion. For example, the plaintiff's property was under water between 1957 and 1963.
Since 1963, the shoreline had moved seaward. Id. at 2905.
184. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991).
185. Id. at 896.
186. Id. at 902.
187. Id. at 896.
188. Id. at 899. These factors are: (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the
regulation's interference with investment-backed expectations; (3) the character of the
government action; and (4) the nature of the state's interest in the regulation. See Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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prevent a serious harm to the public.' 8 9 This was, of course, nothing
more than the old "noxious use" rule. The majority opinion treated this
as a per se rule: if the regulation is aimed at preventing a noxious use, the
state is never required to compensate, regardless of how much the land-
owner is harmed.190
The majority opinion then concluded that since the landowner had
not challenged the Act's legislative findings that new construction
causes serious public harm, 19 he had conceded that his proposed use
would be harmful and thus fall within the noxious use no compensation
rule. 19 2 Thus, the majority concluded, Lucas was not entitled to com-
pensation even though the regulation deprived him of all economically
viable use of his property.'
93
In a strong dissent, two members of the South Carolina court ex-
pressed disagreement with the reasoning of the majority opinion. The
dissenting opinion relied on the two-factor test of Agins.19 4 According
to this approach, a land use regulation would constitute a taking if it did
not substantially advance legitimate state interests or if it denied an
owner all economically viable use of his land.19 5 Thus, according to the
dissent, the court must first examine the purpose of the regulation.
19 6
This inquiry would lead to one of three possible conclusions: (1) the
regulation was unconstitutional because the public purpose for which it
was enacted was not considered to be sufficient or legitimate; (2) the
regulation was designed to prevent a nuisance and, therefore, no com-
pensation was required; or (3) the regulation was not designed to pre-
vent a nuisance, but did substantially advance other legitimate state
interests. In this latter situation, a taking would occur if the landowner
was deprived of all economically viable use of his land. 19 7
Unlike the majority, the dissenters did not regard the legislative
findings of fact as conclusive on the issue of whether the regulated activ-
ity caused serious harm to the public. The dissent contended that such
an approach would allow the state to regulate without paying compensa-
tion simply by calling that which it seeks to prevent a nuisance. 19 8 The
dissent then determined that the primary purpose of the Act was not
nuisance prevention since the activities and effects that the Act sought to
189. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899. The court did not specifically indicate how this no com-
pensation rule fit within the Keystone framework, but presumably it felt that it was an aspect
of the nature of the state's interest in regulation.
190. Id. at 900-01. The court cited Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d
327 (S.C. 1984), as an example of the application of the noxious use rule in South
Carolina.
191. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (development site
too close to beach/dune system jeopardizes the stability of this system, accelerates ero-
sion, and endangers adjacent property).
192. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 900.
193. Id. at 902.
194. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
195. Id. at 260.
196. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 906.
197. Id. at 906.
198. Id. at 905.
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prevent were not sufficiently injurious to be considered "noxious." 19 9
Turning to the second factor of the Agins test, the dissent concluded that
the restriction on construction effectively destroyed the market value of
the plaintiff's property.
20 0
C. The Supreme Court Opinion.
On the last day of the October 1991 Term, Justice Scalia, joined by
ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas, is-
sued an opinion reversing the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme
Court. 20 1 Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, but preferred to de-
cide the case by using an investment-backed expectations test instead of
the categorical rule proposed by Justice Scalia.
20 2 Justice Blackmun 20 3
and Justice Stevens20 4 each wrote a dissenting opinion and Justice Sou-
ter issued a separate statement on the question of ripeness.
20 5
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia first determined that the case
was ripe for review by the Court.20 6 He then announced a categorical
rule under which compensation would be required whenever a regula-
tion deprived a property owner of "all economically viable use."' 20 7 Fur-
thermore, the landowner would be entitled to compensation under
these circumstances even though the stated purpose of the regulation
was to prevent harm to the public.20 8 However, Justice Scalia did con-
cede that the government would not be required to compensate a prop-
erty owner for prohibition of uses that were not permitted under
preexisting background principles of nuisance and property law.
2 0 9
1. Ripeness.
Lucas did not challenge the Act on its face; he merely objected to
the Act as applied to his property. 210 However, between the time Lucas
brought suit and the time his case was decided by the South Carolina
Supreme Court, the legislature amended the Act to create a special per-
mit procedure under which a landowner could request the Coastal
Council to allow construction seaward of the setback line. 21 ' The Coun-
cil, therefore, argued that the Court should not review the landowner's
permanent takings claim until after he had requested, and been denied,
a special permit to build.
212
199. Id. at 906.
200. Id. at 907.
201. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2902 (1992).
202. Id. at 2903.
203. Id. at 2904-17.
204. Id. at 2917-25.
205. Id. at 2925-26.
206. Id. at 2891-92.
207. Id. at 2895.
208. Id. at 2899.
209. Id. at 2900.
210. Id. at 2907 n.4.
211. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
212. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2891.
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The Court had previously addressed the ripeness issue in MacDon-
ald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County.213 In MacDonald, a developer, whose
proposed plan was rejected, claimed that this action effectively restricted
his property to unsuitable uses. 2 14 However, the Court declared that it
could not decide whether a taking had occurred until the county had
made a "final and authoritative determination" of the type and intensity
of development that it would permit on the plaintiff's property.
2 1 5
Justice Scalia agreed that the landowner's permanent takings claim
was not ripe for review as long as he could apply for a special permit to
build houses on his lots. 2 16 However, Justice Scalia argued that the
Court could review a temporary takings claim, 2 17 notwithstanding the
establishment of a special permit procedure in 1990.218 According to
Justice Scalia, even if Lucas eventually obtained a special permit to build
on his beachfront lots, the state supreme court decision upholding the
validity of the statute effectively foreclosed any claim for loss of use of
the property between 1988 and 1990.219 On this basis, Justice Scalia
concluded that the Court could review the landowner's temporary tak-
ings claim.
220
Considering the availability of a special permit procedure, it is
rather surprising that a majority of the Court was willing to decide the
Lucas case. The Court could have vacated the judgment of the South
Carolina Supreme Court and remanded it back to the state courts for
further consideration in light of the 1990 amendments. At that point,
Lucas could have brought an action for a temporary taking in state
court. 2 2 1 However, as Justice Blackmun observed, "Clearly, the Court
was eager to decide this case."
'222
Although Justice Souter and the dissenters disagreed with the
Court's action, it can be defended on two grounds. First, it would have
been unfair to require the landowner, who brought his case before three
courts, to then go through a lengthy and uncertain administrative pro-
cess followed by additional litigation, to find out whether or not he
213. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
214. Id. at 344.
215. Id. at 348; see also Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190-91 (1985) (factors involved in taking issue could not be properly
evaluated until agency had made a final, definitive decision about how the regulation
would be applied to the claimant's property).
216. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2891.
217. The Court acknowledged that compensation was required for a temporary regula-
tory taking in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304,
321 (1987).
218. The special permit procedure became available after the Lucas case was argued
but before it was decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890-
91.
219. Id. at 2891-92.
220. Id. Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the landowner's claim
for a temporary regulatory taking claim was ripe. Id. at 2902.
221. Id. at 2909 n.7.
222. Id. at 2909.
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could build a house on his property.2 2 3 Second, the Lucas case
presented an excellent opportunity for the Court to shed some light on
the takings issue.
2. The Categorical Rule.
Justice Scalia observed that there were at least two types of regula-
tory action that required compensation "without case-specific inquiry
into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint. ' 22 4 The
first involved physical invasions or appropriations of private property;
the second included cases where government regulation denied all eco-
nomically beneficial or productive use of the land.2 25 Since the state
courts had conceded that the regulation completely destroyed the eco-
nomic value of the beachfront lots, Justice Scalia believed that the only
issue before the Court was whether compensation could be required in
this situation when the purpose of the regulation was to prevent a seri-
ous harm to the public.
Justice Scalia concluded compensation was necessary when a regu-
lation deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his or
her property.22 6 He declared that a regulation that allowed no econom-
ically beneficial use did not merely adjust "the benefits and burdens of
economic life" in a manner that secured an "average reciprocity of ad-
vantage" to everyone concerned; rather, the effect of such a regulation
was similar to a physical appropriation. 22 7 Furthermore, because confis-
catory regulations were extremely rare, Justice Scalia did not feel that a
compensation requirement in such cases would impair vital governmen-
tal functions. 228 Finally, Justice Scalia claimed that a categorical rule
would discourage local governments from pressing private property into
public service under the guise of mitigating some public harm. 229
The case for a categorical rule in "total deprivation" cases is a com-
pelling one. If the essential meaning of the Takings Clause is that the
rights of individuals should not be sacrificed to promote some greater
public good,23 0 a rule that vindicates that principle is completely appro-
priate. The categorical rule promulgated in Lucas does not insulate
property owners against reasonable regulation; it merely requires the
state to exercise its power of eminent domain when it destroys the value
of an individual's property in order to achieve some otherwise desirable
governmental objective.
There may, however, be some problems with the application ofJus-
tice Scalia's categorical rule. For example, the concept of "deprivation
223. Cf. Burling, supra note 113, at 346 (arguing that the cost of multiple administrative
proceedings can exhaust a property owner's resources).
224. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2893.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2895.
227. Id. at 2894.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2894-95.
230. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 58.
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of all economically valuable use" may be indeterminate. 23 ' Because this
concept is central to operation of the categorical rule, it should have
been fleshed out more in Lucas.2 3 2 For example, does this mean that
uses should be considered "economically valuable" only if they are ap-
propriate to the physical character of the land, to its geographical loca-
tion, and to the land-use patterns of the surrounding area?
23 3
Hopefully, in future decisions, the Court will give the term "deprivation
of all economically valuable use" an interpretation that is consistent with
the rationale behind categorical rule. Another problem is that of deter-
mining which property interests should be taken into account in decid-
ing whether a landowner has suffered a total deprivation.2 3 4 However,
as discussed earlier, this difficulty arises whenever economic loss is cal-
culated in fractional terms, as it is in the diminution-in-value test and
Penn Central's economic impact test.23 5 Therefore, the "conceptual sep-
aration" problem is not unique to the categorical rule and should not be
cited a reason for rejecting Justice Scalia's categorical approach to total
deprivations.
3. The Noxious Use Rule.
As the dissenters pointed out, the categorical rule announced in Lu-
cas was inconsistent with Mugler and a long line of other noxious use
cases. Rather than overrule these cases directly, Justice Scalia attempted
to incorporate them into a takings formula based on the Agins two part
test. Thus, Justice Scalia characterized the noxious use rule as the pro-
genitor of the principle that "land-use regulation does not effect a taking
if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests.' ",236 In this fash-
ion, he transformed the noxious use rule from a doctrine that denied
compensation into a doctrine that invalidated police power regulations
because they failed to satisfy the first part of the Agins test. According to
this analysis, a regulation that was intended to control a noxious use met
the first requirement of Agins, but compensation would still be required
under the second part of the Agins test if the regulation deprived the
landowner of all economically beneficial use of his or her property.
2 3 7
Justice Scalia's attempt to link the noxious use rule with substantive
due process was probably ill-advised. To be sure, many of the early nox-
ious use cases were primarily concerned with the state's power to regu-
231. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2913.
232. In fairness to justice Scalia, it should be pointed out that the concept of depriva-
tion of all economically valuable use originated in the Agins case. In the 12 years since
Agins was decided, no one on the Court has ever attempted to explain what this concept
means.
233. For example, in Lucas, virtually the entire 3 1/2 mile beachfront side of the Wild
Dunes Resort was occupied by single family homes, condominiums or resort-owned recre-
ational facilities. To suggest, therefore, that the lots had economic value because the land-
owner could "picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in a moveable trailer"
was inconsistent with this standard.
234. Id. at 2913, 2919-20.
235. See Radin, supra note 126, at 1676.
236. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
237. Id. at 2898-99.
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late, rather than with the effect of the regulation on the claimant; but the
rule, at least in the twentieth century,2 3 8 has been predominantly associ-
ated with takings analysis, not with substantive due process. 23 9 Nor, can
it be said, as Justice Scalia suggested, that the noxious use rule does not
allow deprivation of all economic value.2 40 Even though many of the
regulations in question merely prohibited noxious uses,24 1 their practi-
cal effect was to render the property useless and unproductive.2 42 The
inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the noxious use rule autho-
rizes total deprivation of economic benefit and, as such, is completely
inconsistent with Justice Scalia's categorical rule.
The categorical rule announced in Lucas, however, not only rejects
the noxious use rule, but also abrogates the harm/benefit test. The
harm/benefit test provides that no taking occurs if a regulation merely
prevents property owners from causing harm to others, although com-
pensation will be required if the purpose of the regulation is to confer a
benefit on the public that it does not already enjoy. 24 3 It is clear that the
no taking/no compensation aspect of this rule applies even when the
regulation allows no profitable use of the property. 24 4 For this reason,
the harm/benefit test is often relied upon by state courts to uphold re-
strictive environmental regulations.2 4 5 Now, as a result of the Lucas de-
cision, state courts will no longer be able utilize the harm/benefit test to
uphold regulations that deprive landowners of all beneficial use of their
land.
This repudiation of the harm/benefit test is long overdue. The
harm/benefit approach is analytically unsound because the distinction
between preventing a harm and providing a benefit is largely illusory.2 46
Furthermore, the harm/benefit test is easily manipulated because the
concept of harm can be expanded to cover just about anything the gov-
238. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (upholding a local
ordinance which prevented gravel pit from continuing in business); Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (upholding law that called for the destruction of infected cedar
trees); Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 195-96 (1925) (upholding seizure of liquor in
private homes).
239. See, e.g., Patrick Wiseman, When the End justifies the Means: Understanding Takings Ju-
risprudence in a Legal System with Integrity, 63 ST. JOHNs L. REv. 433, 459 (1988) (approving
the no compensation aspect of the noxious use rule); but see Stoebuck, supra note 144, at
1062 (arguing that the noxious use rule is really a due process test, not a takings test).
240. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
241. See Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New
Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAw. 735, 771 (1988).
242. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2918-19.
243. Peterson, supra note 76, at 106.
244. Hunter, supra note 49, at 324.
245. See Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (S.C. 1984)
(upholding a prohibition against filling in wetlands); Graham v. Estuary Prop. Inc., 399 So.
2d 1374, 1380-83 (Fla. 1981) (upholding a ban on destruction of mangrove forest);Just v.
Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (Wis. 1972) (upholding ordinance that regu-
lated filling along banks of navigable lakes).
246. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897 ("the distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-
conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder"). See also Connors, supra note
83, at 184; Williams, Jr. et al., supra note 133, at 221.
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ernment wants to regulate or prohibit.2 4 7 This has allowed some courts
to uphold confiscatory regulations while giving little or no consideration
to their effect on property owners.
2 48
4. The "Nuisance Exception."
Justice Scalia declared that when the government deprived a land-
owner of all economically beneficial use, it could avoid the duty to com-
pensate only by showing that the use interest destroyed by the
regulation had never been part of the landowner's title.2 49 Further-
more, Justice Scalia warned, the notion that title to land was subject to
an implied limitation that the state could subsequently eliminate all eco-
nomically valuable use was "inconsistent with the historical compact re-
corded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional
culture."
2 50
According to Justice Scalia, limitations on land use that relieved the
government of the duty to compensate "must inhere in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property
and nuisance already place upon land ownership." '2 5 1 Any inquiry on
this issue would ordinarily entail an analysis of: (1) the degree of harm
to public lands or resources, or adjacent property, posed by the claim-
ant's proposed activities; (2) the social value of the claimant's activities
and their suitability to the locality in question; and (3) the relative ease
with which the alleged harm could be avoided through measures taken
by the claimant, the government, or adjacent landowners. 2 52 As Justice
Scalia himself admitted, courts examined these same factors to deter-
mine the existence of a private nuisance. 2 53 Justice Scalia also pointed
out that the fact that a particular use has been engaged in by similarly
situated owners ordinarily imported a lack of any common-law prohibi-
tion, as did the fact that other landowners, similarly situated, were per-
mitted to continue the use denied the claimant.
2 54
Finally, Justice Scalia declared that this issue was one of state law
that must be decided by the state courts on remand. However, he sug-
gested that common-law principles would rarely prevent all construction
or improvement on a landowner's property. 25 5 Furthermore, Justice
Scalia emphasized that, on remand, the state could not simply cite legis-
lative findings or make conclusive applications of common-law maxims
247. Berchin, supra note 84, at 911.
248. In Lucas, for example, the state court accepted at face value the Legislature's con-
clusion that beach erosion caused harm to beach/dune areas, that new construction con-
tributed to beach erosion, and that the state could, therefore, prohibit new construction
without payment of compensation, regardless of its effect on landowners. Lucas, 404
S.E.2d at 900-02.
249. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. Justice Stevens labeled this as a "nuisance exception."
Id. at 2920.
250. Id. at 2900.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 2901 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826-831 (1977)).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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in order to sustain the regulation. 2 56 In effect, the state would have to
show that construction of a house on the beachfront property would
constitute a common-law nuisance.
25 7
In the abstract, no one could disagree with the proposition that no
taking can occur unless the claimant is deprived of a legally recognized
property interest.2 58 Nevertheless, the dissenters expressed great con-
cern about the operation of the nuisance exception in Justice Scalia's
takings framework. These concerns, however, seemed to relate more to
the categorical rule rather than the nuisance exception.
One argument, for example, was that the categorical rule and nui-
sance exception were unnecessary because legislatures could make de-
terminations about background principles of nuisance or property law as
effectively as courts.25 9 In effect, every new regulation represents a leg-
islative readjustment of nuisance or property principles; thus, the legis-
lative act that establishes the regulation would also place the regulated
activity within the nuisance exception by declaring it to be unlawful.
This is essentially how the harm/benefit test works. However, the nui-
sance exception in Lucas quite properly places the responsibility for de-
termining background principles on the courts. Courts have a clear
institutional advantage over legislatures when it comes to making deci-
sions about existing nuisance and property law. Legislatures are inher-
ently political institutions which often represent narrow special interest
groups rather than the general public. 260 Courts, on the other hand, are
experienced in dealing with legal concepts and are more likely to be
neutral decision-makers.
It was also suggested that the nuisance exception would have the
effect of protecting existing lawful uses of property against subsequent
prohibition. 26 1 It is true that under Justice Scalia's takings framework,
the state legislature could not unilaterally characterize some activity as a
nuisance and thereby prohibit it completely without payment of com-
pensation. That does not mean, however, that this new takings formula
"effectively freezes the State's common law, denying the legislature
much of its power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of
property. '2 62 Background principles of nuisance and property law are
still free to change over time as they always have in the past.
2 63
In sum, the nuisance exception is a logical corollary to Justice
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2901-02.
258. See, e.g. Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1905); New Orleans Gas Light
Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453, 462 (1905).
259. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
260. Some theorists have argued that legislative decisions are seldom made on grounds
of public policy. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
261. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262. Id.
263. For a discussion of changes in the law of prescription, implied dedication, custom,
and the public trust doctrine and the effect of these changes on littoral rights. See supra nn.
12-44 and accompanying text.
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Scalia's categorical rule. The dissenters' attacks on the nuisance excep-
tion lack plausibility and reflect their dislike of the categorical rule,
rather than any genuine concern about the rule's exception.
IV. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE COURT'S NEW TAKINGS THEORY.
In recent years, the Supreme Court began to show more concern
for property owners. 2 64 Kaiser Aetna,2 65 Loretto,26 6 First English,26 7 and
Nollan,2 6 8 along with Lucas, are illustrative of this trend. This portion of
the Article examines some of the consequences of the Court's new treat-
ment of regulatory takings claims.
A. Effect on Property Owners.
In the past, property owners who sought to challenge burdensome
regulations faced a number of procedural and evidentiary barriers. For
example, the Court rigorously enforced its rules relating to ripeness and
exhaustion of administrative remedies, thereby delaying judicial review
of any takings claim until dilatory local officials reached a final adminis-
trative decision on a landowner's request to develop.2 69 In addition, in
its application of the "rational basis" test, the Court generally accepted
at face value legislative findings about the public purpose served by the
regulation and the effectiveness of the means employed. 2 70 Further-
more, the Court often rejected takings claims even when a regulation
imposed a severe burden on affected property owners. 2 7' All of this
gave government agencies a decided advantage when property owners
sought to challenge restrictive or oppressive regulations.
The Court's new takings jurisprudence improves the position of
claimants somewhat at the expense of the government. The Court's
willingness to accept the Lucas case for review suggests that it may be
264. Burling, supra note 113, at 313.
265. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
266. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
267. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
268. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
269. See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351-53
(1986) (developer whose initial development plan was turned down required to submit
revised plan before bringing takings claim); Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193-94 (1985) (claimant required to seek a vari-
ance from local zoning board before bringing takings claim).
.270. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-88
(1987) (agreeing that mining companies could be required to leave coal in place to protect
surface owners from effects of subsidence); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261
(1980) (agreeing that density requirements were necessary to protect city against conse-
quences of urban growth); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134-
35 (1978) (agreeing that historic preservation law served a public purpose); Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1962) (agreeing that a ban on excavation promoted
safety).
271. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979) (prohibition on the sale of
privately-owned eagle feathers upheld); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)
(local ban on excavation below water table upheld even though it effectively destroyed
claimant's gravel excavation business).
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prepared to relax its ripeness and exhaustion rules, at least in cases
where it is apparent that no change in position is likely to occur on the
part of local legislators. This shift in the Court's approach is to be com-
mended. While ripeness and exhaustion doctrines are obviously essen-
tial to the efficient operation of the judicial system, they can sometimes
be unfair to landowners who are forced to expend time and money seek-
ing variances and pursuing administrative appeals when it is obvious
that permission to develop will ultimately be denied.
2 7 2
The "rational nexus" requirement of Nollan also exemplifies the
Court's newfound solicitude for property owners. 2 73 It indicates that
the Court is not going to automatically defer to implausible legislative
statements of purpose, but instead will make an independent evaluation
of the legislative purpose of a challenged regulation. 2 74 This does not
mean a return to the Lochner2 7 5 era when the Court felt free to make its
own decisions about the social or economic wisdom of state legislation.
Rather, it means that the Court will not be deterred by legislative asser-
tions of public purpose from invalidating regulations, like that involved
in Nollan, that are nothing more than blatant appropriations of priygte
property.
The Lucas Court's repudiation of the noxious use and harm/benefit
rules, insofar as they purport to authorize regulations that totally de-
stroy the value of private property without compensation, will provide
property owners with greater protection against overreaching by gov-
ernment officials and legislators who wish to please taxpayers by secur-
ing the benefits of public beaches and wildlife sanctuaries without
paying for them. 2 76 The holding in Lucas is also reassuring because it
contradicts the certain radical notions about private property that have
been espoused by a segment of the environmental movement.2 7 7 .
Finally, the First English decision, upholding a claim for a temporary
taking, will discourage the enactment of clearly invalid regulations, be-
cause it imposes an economic cost in the form of damages on communi-
ties that act in such a manner. The holding in First English- will
encourage expeditious resolution of regulatory takings claims because it
penalizes delay if the regulation is subsequently found to be invalid.. In
the past, regulatory agencies had no reason to move the decisional pro-
cess along. Now the threat of a damage claim provides an incentive'for
these agencies respond more quickly to development requests.
272. Burling, supra note 113, at 346.
273. Lawrence, supra note 137, at 253.
274. Krueger, supra note 89, at 905.
275. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
276. Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto:
A Reply to the "Gang of Five's " Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Propeity, 19
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 685, 697 (1986).
277. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 49, at 317-20 (endorsing Aldo Leopold's theories of
"land ethic" and "stewardship"); Large, supra note 85, at 1045 (because of spillover ef-
fects, "land cannot be neatly divided into mine and yours"). See also Devall, The Deep Ecol-
ogy Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 299 (1980).
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B. Effect on Land Use and Environmental Regulation.
Even prior to the Lucas decision, some environmentalists criticized
the Court's takings jurisprudence because, in their view, it unduly lim-
ited the government's power to protect ecological resources from de-
struction by private property owners. 278 In Lucas itself, some members
of the Court expressed concern that the new takings formula might be
too restrictive.2 79 However, as the discussion below attempts to illus-
trate, the Court's new takings framework will not invalidate most ex-
isting forms of shoreline protection regulation.
1. Dune Protection Legislation.
Sand dunes stabilize beach areas, act as buffers against storms and
provide a habitat for wildlife. 280 At the same time, sand dunes and their
associated vegetation are vulnerable to the effects of development.
2 8 1
Consequently, it makes sense to preserve the dune environment when-
ever possible. A few states enacted legislation that specifically protects
sand dunes.2 82 Typically, these statutes prohibit the destruction of
dunes or construction near dune lines. In general, unless a lot is ex-
tremely shallow, compliance with dune protection regulations is not dif-
ficult. Therefore, the Court's new takings framework should have no
significant effect on dune protection laws.
2. Beach Access Legislation.
Several states enacted beach access provisions. 283 Obviously there
is no constitutional problem with statutes that predicate public rights on
existing property law concepts, such as prescription, implied dedication
or custom. Development exactions are another matter. The mandatory
dedication of an easement that runs from a public road to a beach might
satisfy Nollan's rational nexus test if it was required of developers as part
of the initial development approval process. This is because large-scale
residential or commercial construction along a previously undeveloped
shoreline might in fact interfere with existing public access. However,
278. See Hunter, supra note 49, at 320 ("Current takings doctrine does not adequately
permit the government sufficient latitude to enforce the obligations land owners have to-
ward the 'land community.' "); Developments in the Lao--Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427,
1620 (1978) (takings clause labeled as "the major obstacle to effective environmental land
use regulation").
279. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Id. at 2922 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
280. Jeter M. Watson & Richard H. Sedgley, Land Use Regulation by the Virginia Marine
Resources Commission: The Virginia Wetlands Act and Coastal Primary Sand Dune Protection Act, 7
VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 381, 387-88,(1988).
281. Zalkin, supra note 6, at 213-14.
282. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 215-A:3 (Supp.
1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-113(b)(6)(a), 113A-120(a)(6) (West 1991); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 48-39-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 63.011 (West
1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-1400 (Michie 1992).
283. E.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30214 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 113A-134.1 to 134.3 (1991); TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 61.011-61.025 (West 1978
& Supp. 1992).
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requiring individual lot owners to dedicate a portion of their land as a
condition to obtaining a building permit, as was done in Nollan, should
not be allowed. Once a shoreline area becomes developed, the govern-
ment should pay for an easement if it wishes to provide public access to
beach areas.
3. Construction Setback Lines.
Beach erosion is occurring in many areas of the country. 28 4 As
mentioned earlier, a number of states established fixed construction set-
back lines in coastal areas in order to control this problem.28 5 As long
as setback lines are not located too far from existing shorelines, land-
owners should be able to coexist with them. A few states established
floating construction setback lines.2 8 6 Floating setback lines are proba-
bly more effective erosion control devices than fixed ones. 2 8 7 When this
technique is employed, the setback line may be located a considerable
distance inland if the shoreline fluctuates widely over time. Obviously, a
deep setback line is more likely to cover an entire lot, as in Lucas, than a
shallow one. Furthermore, the chances of a total deprivation are much
greater when a setback is established along a fully developed shoreline.
In fact, the floating setbacks are probably impractical in areas, such as
Wild Dunes, where development occurs along an unstable shoreline.
4. Wetlands Protection Legislation.
The Lucas decision is likely to have its greatest impact on wetlands
protection regulations. Coastal wetlands are extremely productive and
valuable natural resources.2 8 8 The estuarine environment, however, is
also highly vulnerable to the effects of development. 28 9 For this reason,
many states regulate dredging and filling in wetland areas. 290 Unfortu-
nately, wetlands are essentially worthless from the landowner's point of
view if permission to dredge or fill is denied.
2 9 '
In the past, some courts upheld denials of dredge and fill permits
on the theory that no compensation was required when the purpose of
the regulation was to protect the estuarine environment from harm.
292
284. Owens, supra note 45, at 626.
285. ALA. CODE § 9-7-10 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7004 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 205A-43(a) (1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 438A(1) (1989 & Supp. 1991).
286. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.053 (West 1988); N.Y. ENvrL. CONSERV. LAW § 34-
0103(3)(a) (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-1 18 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-
39-290(B)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
287. Hwang, supra note 46, at 13.
288. Binder, supra note 61, at 18-30.
289. See Hunter, supra note 49, at 339-40.
290. CAL. Pua. RES. CODE § 30233 (West 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.91 to 403.929
(West 1986 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-286 (Michie 1992); MD. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. § 9-202 (Supp. 1992); MIss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-9 (1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 482-A:3 (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-4 (West 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-18
(1991).
291. Large, supra note 90, at 4-5.
292. See, e.g., Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (S.C.
1984); Graham v. Estuary Prop. Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1381 (Fla. 1981).
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However, that rationale is no longer valid after Lucas. State courts could
rule that the destruction of wetlands was nuisance-like in terms of its
effect on the public welfare, 29 3 but it would be hard for them to justify
such a conclusion in light of the fact that development activities in wet-
lands areas are not unusual even in this era of heightened environmental
consciousness. 29 4 Nor could a court avoid the effect of Lucas by arguing
that title to wetlands does not carry with it any right to alter their natural
state.2 95 The logic Lucas appears to support the existence of a land-
owner's right to improve or develop property that is not economically
productive in its natural state. 2 96 Therefore, Lucas would seem to dic-
tate that the states must either place generous variance provisions in
their wetlands protection statutes or create programs to purchase devel-
opment rights in wetland areas.
CONCLUSION.
The Lucas holding was a narrow one, covering only situations where
a regulation completely destroys the economic value of a landowner's
property. However, Lucas, when read together with other recent deci-
sions, indicates that the Court shifted its takings doctrine in favor of
landowners. The Court's implicit repudiation of the no compensation
aspect of the harm/benefit test is particularly significant. Undoubtedly,
the Court's new takings framework will impose some constraints on land
use and environmental regulation. However, this is a price that must be
paid if property rights are to be protected against unduly restrictive gov-
ernmental regulation.
293. Cf. Coletta, supra note 124, at 357 (arguing that much development is nuisance-
like in character and may thus fall within the an expanded nuisance exception principle).
294. It will be recalled that Justice Scalia cautioned in Lucas that "[t]he fact that a par-
ticular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack
of any common-law prohibition though changed circumstances or new knowledge may
make what was previously permissible no longer so." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
295. This notion was first proposed in Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768
(Wis. 1972). One commentator referred to this as the "when you buy a swamp you just get
a swamp" theory of takings. See Burling, supra note 113, at 351.
296. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901 ("It seems unlikely that common-law principles would
have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's
land; they rarely support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land.").
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